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Economists are accustomed to letting the “market” solve resource-allocation
problems. The primary theoretical justi…cation for this laissez-faire posi-
tion is the “…rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics” (see Debreu
(1957)), which establishes that, provided all goods are priced, a competitive
equilibrium is Pareto e¢cient. Implicit in the “all-goods-priced” hypothe-
sis, however, is the assumption that there are no signi…cant externalities; an
externality, after all, can be thought of as an unpriced commodity.
Once externalities are admitted, the …rst welfare theorem no longer ap-
plies. Thus, a school of thought dating back to Pigou (1932), if not earlier,
calls for government-imposed “mechanisms” (e.g., taxes on pollution) as a
way of redressing the market failure.
In opposition to the Pigouvian school, however, proponents of the Coase
Theorem (Coase, 1960) argue that, even in the presence of externalities,
economic agents should still be able to ensure a Pareto-e¢cient outcome
without government intervention provided that there are no constraints on
their ability to bargain and contract. The argument is straightforward: if a
prospective allocation is ine¢cient, agents will have the incentive to bargain
their way to a Pareto improvement. Thus, even if markets themselves fail,
Coasians hold that there is still a case for laissez-faire.
The Coasian position depends, however, on the requirement that any
externality present be excludable in the sense that the agent giving rise to it
1has control over who is and who is not a¤ected by it. A pure public good,
which, once created, will be enjoyed by everybody, constitutes the classic
example of a nonexcludable externality.
To see what goes wrong with nonexcludable externalities, consider pollu-
tion. For many sorts of pollution, particularly that of the atmosphere or sea,
it is fairly accurate to say that a polluter cannot choose to pollute one group
of agents rather then another, that is, pollution can be thought of as a pure
public bad and hence pollution reduction as a public good.
Nowimagine that thereis a set of communities that all emit pollution and
are adversely a¤ected by these emissions. Suppose, however, that reducing
pollution emission is costly to a community (say, because it entails curtailing
or modifying the community’s normal activities). It is clear that if communi-
ties act entirely ontheir own, therewill betoolittle pollutionreduction, since
a community shares the bene…t of its reduction with the other communities
but must bear the full cost alone. A Coasian might hope, however, that if
communities came together to negotiate a pollution-reduction agreement –
in which each community agrees to undertake some reduction in exchange
for other communities’ promises to do the same – a Pareto-e¢cient reduction
might be attainable. The problem is, however, that any given community
(let us call it “C”) will calculate that if all the other communities negotiate
an agreement, it is better o¤ not participating. By staying out, C can enjoy
the full bene…ts of the negotiated reduction (this is where the nonexcludibil-
ity assumption is crucial) without incurring any of the cost. Presumably, the
2agreed reduction will be somewhat smaller than had C participated (since
the bene…ts are being shared among only N¡1 rather then N participants).
However, this di¤erence is likely to be small relative to the considerable sav-
ing to C from not bearing any reduction costs (we formalize this argument
in section 2 below).1
Hence, it will pay community Ctofree-ride onthe others’ agreement. But
since this is true for every community, there will end up being no pollution-
reduction agreement at all, i.e., the only reduction undertaken will be on an
individualbasis. Weconclude that, inthe case ofnonexcludablepublicgoods,
even a diehard Coasian should agree that outside intervention is needed to
achieve optimality. The government - or some other coercive authority - must
be called ontoimpose a methodfor determining pollution reduction. We call
such a method a mechanism (or game form). Devising a suitable mechanism
may, however, be complicated by the fact that the authority might not know
critical parameters of the problem (e.g., the potential bene…ts that di¤erent
communities enjoy from pollution reduction).
Because environmental issues often entail nonexcludable externalities, the
1Implicit in this argument is the assumption that the other communities cannot, in
e¤ect, coerce community C’s participation by threatening, say, to refrain from negotiating
any agreement at all if C fails to participate. What we have in mind in the idea that
any such threat would not be credible, i.e., it would not actually be carried out if push
came to shove. Also implicit is the presumption that community C will not be o¤ered
especially favorable terms in order to persuade it to join. But notice that if communities
anticipated getting especially attractive o¤ers by staying out of agreements, then they
would all have the incentive to drag their heels about negotiating such agreements and
so the same conclusion about the inadequacy of relying on negotiated settlements would
obtain. For further discussion of these points see Maskin (1994) and Baliga and Maskin
(2002).
3theory of mechanism design (sometimes called “implementation theory”) is
particularly pertinent to the economics of the environment. In this short
survey, we review some of the major concepts, ideas, and …ndings of the
mechanism-design literature and their relevance for the environment.
2 The Model
There are N players or agents, indexed by j 2 f1;2;::;Ng; and a set of
social choices (or social decisions) Y with generic element y: Agents have
preferences over the social choices, and these depend on their preference
parameters or types. Agent j of type µj 2 £j has a utility function Uj(y;µj)
(the interpretation of agent j as a …rm is one possibility, in which case Uj is
…rm j’s pro…t function). Let µ ´ (µ1;::;µN) 2 £ ´ ¦N
i=1£i be the preference
pro…le or state. A choice y is (ex-post) Pareto-e¢cient for preference pro…le
µ if there exists no other decision y0 such that, for all i = 1;:::;N;
Ui(y0;µi) ¸ Ui(y;µi)
with strict inequality for some i. A social choice function (or decision rule)
f is a rule that prescribes an appropriate social choice for each state, i.e., a
mapping f : £ ! Y. We say that f is e¢cient if f(µ) is Pareto e¢cient in
each state µ:
We illustrate this set-up with an example based on the discussion of
pollution in the Introduction. Suppose that N communities (labelled i =
1;:::;N) would like to reduce their aggregate emission of pollution. Suppose
4that the gross bene…ttocommunity j ofa pollution reductionr is µj
p
r where
µj 2 [a;b], and that the cost per unit of reduction is 1. If rj is the reduction
of pollution by community j, r =
PN
i=1ri, and tj is a monetary transfer to




r ¡ rj + tj:
We will assume that there is no net source of funds for the N agents, and








To see why Coasian bargaining will not lead to Pareto-e¢cient pollu-
tion reduction, observe …rst that because preferences are quasi-linear, any
e¢cient social choice function that does not entail in…nite transfers (either
positive or negative) to some communities must implicitly place equal weight
















5However, if there is no reduction agreement, community j will choose
rj = r¤¤




i6=j ri(µi) ¡ rj. Thus, if none of the µi’s
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Note the sharp contrast between (1) and (2). In particular, if all the µi’s







. In other words, the optimum reduction di¤ers from




Now, suppose that the communities attempt to negotiate the Pareto-
e¢cient reduction (1) by, say, agreeing to share the costs in proportion to



























If instead, however, community j stands back and lets the others undertake
















µi > µj; (5)
(4) exceeds (3), and so community j does better to free-ride on the others’
agreement. Furthermore, as we have assumed that all the µi’s are distinct,
notice that (5) must hold for some j, and so a Pareto-e¢cient agreement is
not possible. Indeed, the same argument shows that any agreement involving
two or more communities is vulnerable to free-riding. Thus, despite the
possibility of negotiation, pollutionreduction turns out to be no greater than
in the case where negotiation is ruled out.
Weconclude that somesort ofgovernment intervention is calledfor. Prob-
ably the simplest intervention is for the government to impose a vector of
quotas (q1;:::;qN), where for each j, community j is required to reduce pol-






, then the resulting
outcome will be Pareto e¢cient.
Another familiar kind of interventionis for the government to set a vector
of subsidies (s1;:::;sN), where, for each j, community j is paid sj for each
unit by which it reduces pollution (actually this is not quite complete: to
…nance the subsidies - and thereby ensure feasibility - each community must




, then the outcome
7induced by the subsidies will be Pareto e¢cient.
Notice that both these solutions rely on the assumption that the state is
veri…able to the government.2 But the more interesting - andtypically harder
- case is the one in which the preference pro…le is not veri…able. In that
case, there are two particular information environments that have been most
intensely studied: …rst, the preference pro…le could, although unobservable
to the government, be observable to all the agents (complete information);
or, second, each agent j could observe only his own preference parameter µj
(incomplete information). In either case, the government typically “elicits”
the true state by having the agents play a game or mechanism.
Formally, a mechanism is a pair (M;g) where Mi is agent i’s message
space, M = ¦N
i=1Mi is the product of the individual message spaces with
generic element m; g : M ! Y is an outcome function, and g(m) 2 Y is the
outcome identi…ed by the function.
Returning to our pollution example, we note that if each community j
observes only its own type µj, the government might have the community
“announce” its type so that Mj = £j. As a function of the pro…le of their
announcements ^ µ;3 the government choosesthe reduction levels and transfers:
g(^ µ) = (r1(^ µ);:::;rN(^ µ);t1(^ µ);:::tN(^ µ)):
2They also depend on the assumption that each community’s reduction is veri…able.
If only a noisy signal of a reduction is veri…able, then there is said to be moral hazard.
However, we will assume throughout that the social choice is indeed veri…able so that the
issue of moral hazard does not arise.
3We write the pro…le of announced parameters as ^ µ, to distinguish it from the actual
parameters µ.
8To predict the outcome of the mechanism, we must invoke an equilibrium
concept. The appropriate equilibrium concept depends on the information
environment, so we study the complete and incomplete information settings
separately.
3 Complete Information
We begin with complete information. This is the case in which all agents
observe the preference pro…le (the state) µ but it is unveri…able to the
mechanism-imposing authority. It is most likely to be a good approximation
whenthe agents all knowoneanother well, but the authority is a comparative
outsider.
Let S be a equilibrium concept such as Nash equilibrium, subgame per-
fect equilibrium, etc. Let OS(M;g;µ) be the set of equilibrium outcomes of
mechanism (M;g) in state µ:
A social choice function f is implemented by the mechanism (M;g) in the
solution concept S if OS(M;g;µ) = f(µ) for all µ 2 £: In that case, we say
f is implementable in S: Notice that, in every state, we require that all the
equilibrium outcomes be optimal (we will say more about this below).
3.1 Nash Implementation
Suppose …rst that S is Nash equilibrium. A message pro…le m is a Nash
equilibrium in state µ if
Ui(y(m);µi) ¸ Ui(y(m0
i;m¡i);µi)
9for all i = 1;:::;N; and all m0
i 2 Mi where m¡i is the pro…le of messages
(m1;:::;mi¡1;mi+1;:::;mN) that excludes mi:
We note that it is easy to ensure that at least one equilibrium outcome
coincides with what the social choice function prescribes if there are three or
more agents (N ¸ 3): let all agents announce a state simultaneously. If N¡1
or more agree and announce the same state ^ µ; then let g(^ µ) = f(^ µ); de…ne
the outcome arbitrarily if fewer than N ¡ 1 agents agree. Notice that, if µ is
the true state, it is an equilibrium for every agent to announce ^ µ = µ; leading
to the outcome f(µ), since a unilateral deviation by any single agent will not
change the outcome. However, it is equally well an equilibrium for agents
to unanimously announce any other state (and there are many nonunani-
mous equilibria as well). Hence, uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome is a
valuable property of an implementing mechanism.
To ensure that it is possible to construct such a mechanism, we require
the social choice function satis…es monotonicity. A social choice function f is
monotonic if for any µ;Á 2 £ and y = f(µ) such that y 6= f(Á); there exists
an agent i and outcome y0 such that Ui(y;µi) ¸ Ui(y0;µi) but Ui(y0;Ái) >
Ui(y;Ái): That is, a social choice function is monotonic if whenever there is
an outcome y that is optimal in one state µ but not in another Á, there exists
an agent i and an outcome y0 such that agent i strictly prefers y0 to y in
state Á but weakly prefers y to y0 in state µ: This is a form of “preference
reversal.”
The other condition on social choice functions we impose to guarantee
10implementability is noveto power. A social choice function f satis…es no veto
power if whenever agent i; state µ and outcome y are such that Uj(y;µj) ¸
Uj(y0;µj) for all agents j 6= i and all y0 2 y; then y = f(µ): That is, if in state
µ, N ¡ 1 or more agents agree that the best possible outcome is y; then y
is prescribed by f in state µ. Notice that in our pollution example, there is
no alternative that any agent thinks is best: an agent would always prefer a
bigger monetary transfer. Hence, no veto power is automatically satis…ed.
Theorem 1 (Maskin (1999)) If a social choice function is implementable in
Nash equilibrium, then it is monotonic. If N ¸ 3; a social choice function
that satis…es monotonicity and no veto power is Nash implementable.
Proof. Necessity: Supposef is Nashimplementableusing the mechanism
(M;g): Suppose mis a Nash equilibrium of (M;g) instate µ, where f(µ) = y.
Then, g(m) = y: But, if f(µ) 6= f(Á); m cannot be a Nash equilibrium in
state Á: Therefore, there must exist an agent i with a message m0
i and an
outcome y0 = g(m0
i;m¡i) such that
Ui(y0;Ái) = Ui(g(m0
i;m¡i);Ái) > Ui(g(m);Ái) = Ui(y;Ái):
But because m is a Nash equilibrium in state µ; agent i must be willing to
send the message mi rather than m0
i in state µ: Hence,
Ui(y;µi) ¸ Ui(y
0;µi);
implying that f is monotonic.
11Su¢ciency: See Maskin (1999).
It is not hard to verify that in out pollution example, the e¢cient social








tj(µ) = 0; (7)
is monotonic andhence Nashimplementable. Tosee this, chooseµ andµ0, and




































































Here is an alternative but equivalent de…nition of monotonicity: A social
choice function is monotonic if, for any µ,Á; and y = f(µ) such that
Ui(y;µi) ¸ Ui(y0;µi) ) Ui(y;Ái) ¸ Ui(y0;Ái) for all i;
we have y = f(Á). This rendition of monotonicity says that when the out-
come that was optimal in state µ goes up in everyone’s preference ordering
when the state becomes Á, then it must remain socially optimal. Although
this may seem like a reasonable property, monotonicity can be quite a re-
strictive condition:
Theorem 2 (Muller and Satterthwaite (1977)). Suppose that £ consists of
all strict preference orderings on the social choice space Y: Then, any social
choice function that is monotonic and has a range including at least three
choices is dictatorial (i.e., there exists an agent i¤ such that in all states
agent i¤’s favorite outcome is chosen).4
3.2 Other Notions of Implementation
One way to relax monotonicity is to invoke re…nements of Nash equilibrium,
whichmakeiteasier to knock out unwanted equilibriawhileretaining optimal
4Monotonicity is a good deal less restrictive if one considers implementation of social
choice correspondences rather than functions (see Maskin (1999)).
13ones. Let us, inparticular, explore the concept ofsubgame perfect equilibrium
and the use of sequential mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms in which agents send
messages one at a time. We maintain the assumption that the preference
pro…le is common knowledge among the agents but is unveri…able by an
outside party. Therefore, we consider mechanisms of perfect information and
(this is the subgameperfection requirement) strategies that constitute a Nash
equilibrium at any point in the game.
Rather thanstatinggeneral theorems, we focus immediately on our pollu-
tionexample. Forsimplicity, restrict attentionto the caseoftwocommunities
(N = 2). We shall argue that any social choice function in this setting is
implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium using a sequential mechanism.
We note …rst that, for i = 1;2 and any µi;µ
0



























































































Formulas (12) and (13) constitute a preference reversal condition. The
condition says that for any two types µi and µ
0







i ) such that the former is preferred to the latter under µi and
the latter is preferred to the former under µ
0
i.
14In view of preference reversal, we can use the following mechanism to
implement a given social choice function f:
Stage 1
Stage 1.1: Agent 1 announces a type ^ µ1.
Stage 1.2: Agent 2 can agree, in which case we go to Stage 2, or disagree
by announcing some ^ µ
0
1 6= ^ µ1, in which case we go to Stage 1.3.











1 (^ µ1;^ µ
0
1); roo
2 (^ µ1;^ µ
0
1); too
1 (^ µ1;^ µ
0
1)). If he
chooses the former, agent 2 is also …ned p¤; if he chooses the latter, agent 2
receives p¤. The mechanism stops here.
Stage 2: This is thesame asStage1.2 exceptthe roles are reversed: agent
2 announces ^ µ2, and agent 1 can either agree or disagree. If he agrees, we go











1 (^ µ2;^ µ
0
2); roo
2 (^ µ2;^ µ
0
2); too
2 (^ µ2;^ µ
0
2)). If he
chooses the former, agent 1 is also …ned p¤; if he chooses the latter, agent 1
receives p¤.
Stage 3: If ^ µ1 and ^ µ2 have been announced, the outcome f(^ µ1;^ µ2) is
implemented.
We claim that, in state (µ1;µ2); there is a unique subgame perfect equi-
librium of this mechanism, in which agent 1 truthfully announces ^ µ1 = µ1
and agent 2 truthfully announces ^ µ2 = µ2, so that the equilibrium outcome
is f(^ µ1;^ µ2). To see this, note that in Stage 2, agent 1 has the incentive
to disagree with any untruthful announcement ^ µ2 6= µ2 by setting ^ µ
0
2 = µ2.




2(^ µ2;µ2)) and (roo
1 (^ µ2;µ2); roo
2 (^ µ2;µ2); too
2 (^ µ2;µ2)) and from (13), agent 2 will
choose the latter, and so 1 will collect the large sum p¤. By contrast, agent 1
will not disagree if ^ µ2 is truthful - i.e., ^ µ2 = µ2 - because otherwise (regardless
of what ^ µ
0










2)), thereby requiring 1 to pay a large …ne himself. But this
in turn means that agent 2 will announce truthfully because by doing so he
can avoid the large …ne that would be entailed by 1’s disagreeing. Similarly,
agent 1 will be truthful in Stage 1, and agent 2 will disagree if and only if
1 is untruthful. Because both agents are truthful in equilibrium, the desired
outcome f(µ1;µ2) results in Stage 3.
Herein we have examined only one simple example of implementation in
a re…nement of Nash equilibrium. For more thorough treatments, see the
surveys by Moore(1992), Palfrey(2001), or Maskin and Sjöström(2001).
4 Incomplete Information
We next turn to incomplete information. This is the case in which agent i
observes only his own type µi.
4.1 Dominant Strategies
A mechanism (M;g) that has the property that each agent has a dominant
strategy - a strategy that is optimal regardless of the other agents’ behavior
- is clearly attractive since it means that an agent can determine his optimal
16message without having to calculate those of other agents, a calculation may
be particularly complex under incomplete information.
Formally, a strategy ¹i for agent i is mapping from his type space £i to




i 2 Mi; m¡i 2 M¡i: A strategy pro…le ¹ = (¹1;:::;¹N) is a dominant
strategy equilibrium if, for all i and µi, ¹i(µi) is dominant for µi:
A social choice function f is implemented in dominant strategy equilibrium
by the mechanism (M;g) if there exists a dominant strategy equilibrium ¹
for which g(¹(µ)) = f(µ) for all µ 2 £:5
Of course, implementation in dominant strategy equilibrium is a demand-
ing requirement, and so perhaps not surprisingly it is di¢cult to attain in
general:
Theorem 3 (Gibbard(1973) and Satterthwaite(1975)) Suppose that £ con-
sists of all strict preference orderings. Then, any social choice function that
is implementable in dominant-strategy equilibrium and whose range includes
at least three choices is dictatorial.
Proof. Suppose that f is implementable in dominant-strategy equilib-
rium and that the hypotheses of the theorem hold. Consider µ; µ
0 2 £ such
5Notice that, unlike with implementation in Nash equilibrium, we require only that
some dominant strategy equilibrium outcome coincide with f(µ), rather then that there
be a unique equilibrium outcome. However, multiple equilibria are not typically a seri-
ous problem with dominant strategies. In particular, when preferences are strict (i.e.,
indi¤erence is ruled out), the dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome is, indeed, unique.








for all y0. By assumption, there exists a mechanism (M;g) with a dominant-
strategy equilibrium ¹ such that g(¹(µ)) = y. We claim that
g(¹(µ
0)) = y: (15)
To see why (15) holds, suppose that
g(¹1(µ
0
















0)) = y: (17)
But (17) implies that f(µ
0) = y. We conclude that f is monotonic, and so
Theorem 2 implies that it is dictatorial.
In contrast to the pessimism of Theorem 3, Vickrey (1961) and, more
generally, Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) have shown that much more
18positive results are obtainable when agents’ preferences are quasi-linear.
Speci…cally, suppose that we wish to implement a social choice function
f(µ) = (r1(µ);:::;rN(µ);t1(µ);:::;tN(µ)) entailingPareto-e¢cient pollution re-
duction, i.e., such that
N X
i=1







r ¡ r: (19)




ri + rj ¡ rj; (20)
which clearly does not result in the total reduction being r¤(µ). To bring
the maximands of individual communities and overall society into line, we
shall give community j a transfer equal to the sum of the other communities’






r¤(^ µ) ¡ ri(^ µ)) + ¿j(^ µ¡j); (21)
where ¿j(:) is an arbitrary function of µ¡j. A mechanism in which each agent
j announces ^ µj and the outcome is (r1(^ µ);:::;rN(^ µ);t1(^ µ);:::;tN(^ µ)) where
(r1(:);:::;rN(:)) satis…es (18) and (19), and (t1(:);:::;tN(:)) satis…es (21), is
called a Groves scheme (see Groves (1973)).
We claim that, in a Groves scheme, community j’s telling the truth (an-
nouncing ^ µj = µj) is dominant for µj for all j and all µj. Observe that in
19such a mechanism, community j’s overall payo¤ if it tells the truth and the
other communities announce ^ µ¡j is
µj
q

























r0 ¡ r0 + ¿j(^ µ¡j)
for all r0. In particular, (22) holds when r0 = r¤(^ µj;^ µ¡j), which then implies
that taking ^ µj = µj is dominant as claimed.
Thus, with one proviso, a Groves scheme succeeds in implementing the
Pareto-e¢cient pollution reduction. The proviso is that we have not yet
ensured that the transfer functions (21) are feasible. One way of ensuring
feasibility is to take





















r ¡ r): (23)
When transfers take the form (23), a Groves scheme is called a pivotal mech-
anism or a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Notice that the transfer (23)
is always (weakly) negative, ensuring feasibility.
20The logic underlying (23) is straightforward. If community j’s announce-
ment has no e¤ect on the social choice, the community pays nothing. How-
ever, if it does change this choice (i.e., it is “pivotal”), j pays the correspond-
ing loss imposed on the rest of society. Although the pivotal mechanism
is feasible, it is not balanced, i.e., the transfers do not sum to zero. In-
deed, as shown by Green and La¤ont (1979), no Groves scheme is balanced.
Furthermore, arguments due to Green and La¤ont (1977) imply that in a
slightly more general version of our pollution example, Groves schemes are
essentially the only mechanisms that implement social choice functions with
Pareto-e¢cient pollution reductions. This motivates the search for balanced
mechanisms that invoke a less demanding notion of implementation than in
dominant-strategy equilibrium, a question we turn to in the next subsection.
We have been assuming that each community j’s payo¤ depends directly
only on its own preference parameter µj. Radner and Williams (1988) extend
the analysis to the case when j’s payo¤ may depend on the entire pro…le µ.
We have also been concentrating on the case of Pareto-e¢cient social choice
functions (or at least social choice functions for which the pollution reduc-
tion is Pareto-e¢cient), Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1980) examine
dominant-strategy implementation of more general social choice functions.
4.2 Bayesian Equilibrium
Dominant-strategy equilibrium requires that each agent be willing to use his
equilibrium strategy whatever the behavior of the other agents. Bayesian
21equilibrium requires only that each agent be willing to use his equilibrium
strategy when he expects other agents to do the same. A couple of points
are worth noting here. First, because agents’ equilibrium strategies depend
on their types but, given the incomplete information, an agent does not
know others’ types, we must specify his beliefs about these types to com-
plete the description of the model. Second, if a social choice function is
implementable in dominant-strategy equilibrium, then it is certainly imple-
mentable in Bayesian equilibrium, so by moving to the latter concept, we are
weakening the notion of implementation.
We assume that agents’ types are independently distributed; the density
and distribution functions for agent i of type µi 2 [a;b] are pi(µi) and Pi(µi)
respectively. We suppose that these distributions are common knowledge
amongst the agents. Hence, the c.d.f. for agent i’s beliefs over the types of
the other agents is given by Fi(µ¡i) ´
Q
j6=iPj(µj).
There are twocritical conditions that a social choice function must satisfy
to ensure that it is implementable in Bayesian equilibrium (see Postlewaite
and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991)).
The …rst is Bayesian incentive-compatibility. A social choice function f is




for all i; and µi;µ
0






ity. For this purpose, we de…ne a deception for agent j to be a function
®j : £j ! £j. A deception ® is a pro…le ® = (®1;:::;®N). A social choice
function f is Bayesian monotonic if for all deceptions ® such that f ±® 6= f
there exist j and a function ° : £¡j ! Y such that
EUj(f(µj;µ¡j);µj) ¸ EUj(°(µ¡j);µj)










Jackson (1991) shows that in quasi-linear settings, such as our pollution
example, BICandBayesian monotonicityare not onlynecessary but su¢cient
for a social choice function to be implementable in Bayesian equilibrium.
Let us return to our pollution example. We noted in the previous subsec-
tionthat asocial choice functionentailing Pareto-e¢cient pollution reduction
(i.e., reduction satisfying (18) and (19)) cannot be implemented in dominant-
strategy equilibrium if it is balanced. However, this negative conclusion no
longer holds with Bayesian implementation.






i(µ) = r¤(µ), where r¤(:) satis…es (19)). Con-



























r¤(^ µi;x¡i) ¡ rk(^ µi;x¡i))dFi(x¡i):
Notice that the …rst term (integral) on the right-hand side of (24) is just
the expectation of the sum in (21). Furthermore the other terms in (24) do
not depend on ^ µj. Hence, this mechanism can be thought of as an “expected
Groves scheme.” It was …rst proposed by Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and
Gérard-Varet (1979).
The terms after the …rst integral in (24) are present to ensure balance. If
































































To see that BIC holds (so that truth-telling is an equilibrium) note that













































j;µ¡j) as given by the right-hand side of (24), but with all but the …rst
term omitted (since the other terms on the right-hand side of (24) do not
depend on µ
0
j and hence do not a¤ect incentive compatibility for community











By de…nition of r¤(µ), the square-bracketed expression in (26) is maximized
when µ
0




as required for BIC.
One can readily show that f also satis…es Bayesian monotonicity (but we
will refrain from doing so here). Hence, we conclude that it is implementable
in Bayesian equilibrium (actually, it turns out that the equilibrium outcome
of the expected Groves mechanism is not unique, so, without modi…cation,
that mechanism does not actually implement f). Thus, relaxing the notion
25of implementability from dominant-strategy to Bayesian equilibrium permits
the implementation of balanced social choice functions. On the downside,
however, note that the very construction of the expected Groves mechanism
(or an expected Groves mechanism that is modi…ed so as to ensure unique
equilibrium) requires common knowledge of the distribution of µ.
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